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NOTES
FRONTIERS OF FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING
No nation depends more on the intelligent judgment
of its citizens [than the United States]. No medium has
a more profound influence on public opinion [than the
television news medium]. Nowhere in our system are
there fewer checks on vast power. So, nowhere should
there be more conscientious responsibility exercised than
by the news media....
: *[A] little group of men... wield a free hand in
selecting, presenting and interpreting the great issues in
our nation....
Is it not fair and relevant to guestion [the] concen-
tration [of this great power] in the hands of a tiny,
enclosed fraternity of privileged men elected by no one
and enjoying a monopoly conditioned and licensed by
Government.
I am not asking for Government censorship. I am
asking whether a form of censorship already exists....
As Justice Byron White wrote in his landmark opin-
ion sic months ago, its the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount.'
Mr. Agnew's controversial remarks in November may have
suggested to the uninitiate that there are no reins on the radio
and television broadcasting industry. Many controls, however,
do exist. The power of the broadcast media has long been
recognized, and fairness in its exercise has been a major concern
of the industry and the government. Nonetheless, interest in
this broad subject has been rekindled greatly in the last year.
Mr. Agnew's speech brought it prominently into the political
forum, but the speech itself is only one product of the far-
1. Address by Vice-President Agnew, Mid-West Regional Republican
Committee, Des Moines, Iowa, Nov. 13, 1969; Transcript, N. Y. Times, Nov.
14, 1969, § 1, at 24, col. 1-8, passim.
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reaching Red Lion Broadcasting C0.2 case handed down in June
1969.
The decision, upholding the FCC's fairness doctrine8 and cer-
tain strict regulations promulgated thereunder, seemingly struck
like lightning in the radio-television industry. In this "Bleak
Benchmark in Regulation" 4 the broadcasters "lost more than
they had thought possible."5 The significance of the case lies
more in the dictum than in the advanced holding on the facts of
the case. The dictum provides the support for major extensions
of the fairness doctrine.
One likely extension of the doctrine will be that the Supreme
Court will approve the FCC decision, which was affirmed on
broader grounds by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, that the doctrine applies to cigarette advertising and
that broadcasters must therefore carry at no cost anti-smoking
spots in substantial amounts.6 The Appeals Court decision and
tobacco industry pessimism have already resulted in the an-
nounced withdrawal of all cigarette advertising from television
by the end of 1970. Past annual revenues from cigarette ad-
vertising have been estimated at over $300 million, over seven
percent of total advertising revenue.7 Application of the doc-
trine to advertisements of other products may ensue.8 Equally
disturbing is the fear that the Commission may now be em-
powered to regulate programming itself, even to the extent of
prescribing categories of programs and specifying amounts of
time to be allotted to each.9
The broad concept of fairness in the use of broadcasting facili-
ties has several aspects. The shibboleth "equal time" derives
from the provisions of section 315 of the Communications Act of
2. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 89 S. Ct. 1794 (1969).
3. The fairness doctrine, in essence, requires broadcasters to discuss fairly
both sides of "controversial issues of public importance".
4. A Bleak Benchmark in Regulation, BROADcASTING, June 16, 1969, at 21.
5. Id.
6. Television Station, WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), aff'd 9 F.C.C.2d
921 (1969). Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), invitation to
Solicitor General to file memorandum, 89 S. Ct. 2126 (1969).
7. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 n.83 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
8. See text of notes 110-16 infra. The Commission, however, denies any
such intention.
9. A Legal Go-Ahead for FCC Program Controls?, BROADCASTING, Sept
15, 1969, at 34, refers to a memorandum written by FCC General Counsel
Henry Geller, date not given.
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193410 and properly applies only to broadcasts by political can-
didates. The fairness doctrine, now also enjoying statutory
recognition in the same section,"1 has wide application. Basically,
it covers all "controversial issues of public importance." Specific
regulations deal with personal attacks12 and political editorials 3
10. 48 Stat. 1081, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. 1970), provides:
315. Candidates for public office; facilities; rules.
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting sta-
tion, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates
for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided,
That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the
material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obliga-
tion is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station
by any such candidate. Appearance by a legally qualified candidate
on any-
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the can-
didate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects
covered by the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including
but not limited to political conventions and activities incidental
thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the
meaning of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence
shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the
presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries,
and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation im-
posed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public
interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance.
(b) The charges made for the use of any broadcasting station
for any of the purposes set forth in this section shall not exceed
the charges made for comparable use of such station for other
purposes.
(c) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules and regu-
lations to carry out the provisions of this section. (Emphasis
added.)
11. See italicized portion in note 10.
12. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123(a,b), 73.300(a,b), 73.598(ab), 73.679(ab), provide:
Personal attacks; political editorials.
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial
issue of public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty,
character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified per-
son or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable time and in
no event later than one week after the attack, transmit to the
person or group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and
identification of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accu-
rate summary if a script or tape is not available) of the attack;
and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the
licensee's facilities.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not
be applicable (i) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public
figures; (ii) to personal attacks which are made by legally quali-
fied candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or those associated
with them in the campaign, or other such candidates, their autho-
rized spokesmen, or persons associated with the candidates in the
campaign; and (iii) to bona fide newscasts, bona fide news inter-
views, and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event (in-
3
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-the subject of dispute in the Red Lion case. As noted above,
certain advertising is within its scope.
The purposes of this note are to examine the Red Lion deci-
sion, to survey briefly the law in this broad area, and to preview
the aftermath of Red Lion not only in legal but also in practical
and economic terms.
Mr. Agnew raised both the question of fairness requirements
for newspapers14 and the question of over-concentrated owner-
ship of mass media outlets,15 but both these questions are beyond
the scope of this note.
RED LIoN BROADCASTIWG Co. v. FCC
The unanimous Red Lion opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas not
participating, sustained, over first amendment and statutory
objections, the fairness doctrine as a whole, a Commission order
cluding commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing pro-
grams, but the provisions of paragraph (a) shall be applicable to
editorials of the licensee).
NoTE: The fairness doctrine is applicable to situations coming
within (iii), above, and, in a specific factual situation, may be ap-
plicable in the general area of political broadcasts (ii), above. See
Section 315(a) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) ; Public Notice:
Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Contro-
versial Issues of Public Importance. 29 Fed.Reg. 10415. The
categories listed in (iii) are the same as those specified in Section
315(a) of the Act.
13. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123(c), 73.300(c), 73.598(c), 73.679(c) provide:
(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii)
opposes a legally qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee
shall, within 24 hours after the editorial, transmit to respectively
(i) the other qualified candidate or candidates for the same office
or (ii) the candidate opposed in the editorial (1) notification of
the date and the time of the editorial; (2) a script or tape of
the editorial; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity for a
candidate or a spokesman of the candidate to respond over the
licensee's facilities: Provided, however, That where such editorials
are broadcast within 72 hours prior to the day of the election, the
licensee shall comply with the provisions of this subsection suffi-
ciently far in advance of the broadcast to enable the candidate or
candidates to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response
and to present it in a timely fashion. 47 CFR §§ 73.123, 73.300,
73.598, 73.679 (all identical).
14. No similar fairness regulations apply to the printed press, which is
fully protected in this area, if not in the areas of obscenity or libel, by the
first amendment guarantee of "free press". However, such regulation has
been suggested. Eg., Barron, Access to the Press, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641
(1967) ; Note, A Fairness Doctrine for the Press, 40 N.D.L. REv. 317 (1964).
See also Address by Vice-President Agnew, Alabama Chamber of Commerce,
Montgomery, Alabama, Nov. 20, 1969; Transcript, N. Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1969,
§ 1, at 22, col. 1.
15. For Mr. Agnew's remarks, see materials cited in note 1 supra.
19701 NOTrS
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regarding a personal attack made in 1964, and regulations re-
garding both personal attacks and political editorializing issued
in 1967.1( Two cases were consolidated on appeal. In the first
case, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia 7 sustaining a Commission order"8
requiring a radio station to furnish a person attacked during a
broadcast with a tape, transcript or summary of the broadcast
and to provide reply time whether or not the person attacked
could or would pay for it.' In the second case, the Court re-
versed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit 20 that the regulations were unconstitutional as abridging
the freedom of speech and press.
2 '
The Supreme Court held that the application of the fairness
doctrine in the Red Lion case and the regulations in the form
issued were both authorized by Congress and that they enhanced
rather than abridged the freedom of speech and press.
22
Tracing the history of broadcast regulation, the Court found
the fairness doctrine reflected in legislative history, well-estab-
lished by Commission rulings, and specifically recognized in
statute.23 Offer of free time is required.2 4 The difference be-
tween the general requirement, that the station itself air the
other side of an issue or grant time on request, and the instant
16. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679. See notes 10 and 11 (supra).
17. FCC v. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 381 F2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
18. Letter to John H. Norris (WGCB), Dec. 9, 1965, 1 F.C.C.2d 1587
(1965).
19. WGCB in Red Lion, Pa., broadcast the Rev. Billy James Hargis'
"Christian Crusade" program Nov. 27, 1964. Hargis, in discussing the paper-
back Goldater-Extremist-on the Right by Fred J. Cook, inter alia, called
Cook a communist and a liar. Cook requested an opportunity to reply. WGCB
offered to sell time. Cook demanded free time. The Commission agreed with
Cook. 89 S. Ct. at 1796-97. The Court of Appeals initially dismissed for want
of a reviewable order, but later reversed. The Commission had not complied
fully with procedural formalities but the station waived objection. 89 S. Ct.
1797 n.3.
20. United States v. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n., 400 F2d 1002
(7th Cir. 1968).
21. Shortly after the Red Lion litigation began, the Commission issued a
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 31 Fed. Reg. 5710 (1967), with the purpose
of making the rules for personal attacks (and for political editorials) more
precise and more readily enforceable. After considering written comments, the
Commission adopted the regulations, 32 Fed. Reg. 10303. Two amendments
followed, 32 Fed Reg. 11531 (1967), 33 Fed. Reg. 5362 (1967). 89 S. Ct. at
1797-98.
22. 89 S. Ct. at 1798.
23. Id. at 1801. Whether or not section 315 in fact gave this recognition had
been in dispute. For the Court resolution of the question, see 89 S. Ct. at
1801-04 nn.8-14. See also Comment, Fairness Doctrine: Personal Attacks and
Public Controversies, 56 GEo. L.J., 547, 556 (1968).
24. 89 S. Ct. at 1800, citing Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Radio
Reg. 895 (1963).
[Vol. 2
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requirement, that the individual attacked or the other candidates
be contacted and offered time to reply personally, was declared
"not a critical distinction, and indeed,. not unreason-
able .... ,25
Although the broadcast industry is "clearly" affected by the
first amendment, the Court stated that "differences in the char-
acteristics of new (sic) media justify differences in the first
amendment standards applied to them."28 Chaos in broadcasting
before 1927 necessitated licensing; the number of licenses avail-
able is limited;2 7 licenses grant monopolies over a radio fre-
quency; no one has a first amendment right to such a monopoly.
Therefore, the Government may require a licensee to act in the
public interest:
As a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present
those views and voices which are representative of his
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from the airwaves....
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free
speech by radio and their collective right to have the
medium function consistently with the ends and pur-
poses of the First Amendment. It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount.
28
The Court continued:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopo-
lization of that market, whether it be by the Govern-
ment itself or a private licensee.29
The Court further said, giving rise to broadcasters' present
concern on the advertising and programming control questions:
It is the right of the public to receive suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experiences which is crucial here....
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1805.
27. The Court treated the scarcity issue at length and concluded partly on
the basis of Congressional findings that advances in technology have not kept
pace with demands for radio use as reflected in license applications. Id. at
1810-12. Where gaps in spectrum utilization exist, stations retain fiduciary
obligations based on prior monopoly privileges. Id. at 1812.
28. Id. at 1806.
29. Id.
1970]
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[T]he Government could surely have decreed that each
frequency should be shared among all or some of those
who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of the
broadcast day or the broadcast week....
The statute mandates the issuance of licenses if the
"public convenience, interest or necessity will be served
thereby." 47 U.S.C. § 307(a). In applying this standard
the Commission for 40 years has been choosing licensees
based in part on their program proposals .... [T]he
Commission [is] more than a traffic policeman con-
cerned with the technical aspects of broadcasting and it
neither exceed[s] its powers under the statute nor
transgress[es] the First Amendment in interesting itself
in general program format and the kinds of programs
broadcast by licensees. National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 519 U.S. 190... (1943). 30
The Court rejected the suggestion that licensees would be
induced to diminish their coverage of controversial issues as
unlikely in fact. Any diminution would be considered at licen-
see's renewal time with regard to how well the station served
the public interest in news and political reporting.3' The Court
also rejected the argument that the regulations were too vague.
The Court said that past decisions furnished an adequate guide,
and noted that the Commission indicated that in questionable
cases it would not impose sanctions without warning.32
"EQu AL TmIE" - § 315
The most widely known of the fairness rules are the equal
time provisions of section 315 of the Communications Act of
1934.83 The basic requirement is that a licensee who permits any
legally qualified candidate to use the broadcast facilities must
afford equal opportunities for broadcase to all other legally qual-
ified candidates. It is a requirement of offering "equal opportun-
ities"--that is, the same amount of comparable but not identical
time in the same category of desirability, and at the same rates.
There is no requirement that a station carry any appearances by
30. Id. at 1807, 1809.
31. Id. at 1808.
32. Id. at 1809.
33. 48 Stat. 1801, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. 1970). (The text of
this statute is set out in footnote 10.)
[Vol. 22
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candidates. 34 Free time is not required, and thus a station need
not donate time to a candidate unable to pay.35 Charges for such
political broadcasts, however, must not exceed charges for com-
parable use of the facilities for any other purpose.
The statute was amended in 1959 to except from its general
provisions any appearance by candidates on bona fide newscasts,
news interviews, documentaries and on-the-spot coverage of bona
fide news events.36 However, language incorporating the fair-
ness doctrine was added to the statute to assure fair play in the
exempted categories of broadcasts.
3 7
The section provides expressly that the station has "no power
of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions
of this section." Although this might be read to apply only to
broadcasts by the "second" candidate, the courts have held other-
wise. After early decisions to the contrary,3  the courts have held
that this creates a federal immunity from liability under state
defamation law without regard to whether to broadcast was in
reply.3 9 It was feared that a contrary interpretation might cause
stations not to carry campaign speeches, in obvious obstruction of
the purpose of section 315--to promote political discussion.40 It
rejected the suggestion that stations could without cost exclude
all political broadcasts, as renewal application considerations
included the amount of coverage of politics.
41
Certain minor problems exist in the application of the section.
First, only "legally qualified candidates" are covered. 42 Thus,
the section did not apply where a "Labor and Liberal Commit-
34. This, of course, differs from a station's obligation to cover controversial
issues as noted above by the Red Lion Court. Compare text at note 47 infra.
35. FCC letter to M. R. Oliver, Oct. 23, 1952, 11 P & F Radio Reg. 239
(1954), cited by Scott, Candidate Broadcast Time: A Proposal for Section 315
of. the Communications Act, 56 GEo. L.J. 1037, 1038 n.3 (1968) (hereinafter
cited as Scott).
36. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557, amaending 47
U.S.C. § 315 (1959).
37. 48 Stat. 1801, as amnended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. 1970). See also note
23 supra.
38. Eg., Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1098
(1932), appeal dismissed sub nom., KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorenson, 290
U.S. 599 (1933).
39. Farmers Educ. and Coop. Union of America v. WDAY Inc., 360 U.S.
525 (1959).
40. Id. at 530. Compare the Red Lion discussion of diminished coverage,
supra, note 31. See also text at note 119 infra.
41. 360 U.S. at 534.
42. Such a candidate is one who has publicly announced candidacy, for
nomination, by convention or primary, or for election, at any level, meets the
requirements for the office, and has qualified for a place on the ballot or is
eligible to be written in, etc. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.120, 73.290, 73.590, 73.657.
1970] NoT~s
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tee" sought to purchase time.43 Nor is the immunity from de-
famation actions available where a campaign chairman speaks
on behalf of a candidate.44 An appearance by a non-candidate
alone is covered only by the fairness doctrine. But if the can-
didate appears in a capacity not merely incidental to the appear-
ance of the non-candidate, then the section does apply.45 Second,
any appearance is considered a "use" of the facilities, whether or
not it is intended to have political significance.46 Third, the
news program exemption was put to stress when a candidate for
the Texas legislature appeared seventeen times per week on
television and ten times per week on radio as the "TX Weather-
man" and equal time was not required. 47 Fourth, under the
Commission's rules equal time must be requested within seven
days of an opponent's broadcast; late requests are denied.48
Under a current proposal, if one qualified candidate makes a
broadcast before other candidates qualify, or any time others
qualify subsequent to such an appearance, then the latecomer
may request "equal time" within seven days after he qualifies.
49
The enforcement of the section is left to the Commission.
Sections 501 and 502 provide penal sanctions for willful viola-
tions of the Act or Commission orders.50 Private suitors may
not recover damages. 15 A leading case held that the Act regu-
lates in the public interest and does not create private rights. 2
Therefore analogies to recoveries under the Aeronautics Act
and the Safety Appliance Act 5 4 fail, since those acts were
designed to protect a specified class.55 Of course, there is no
common law duty to treat candidates alike, so no action in fraud
for failure to do so is well grounded.56
43. Rose v. Brown, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 654, 186 Misc 533. (Sup. Ct. 1945).
44. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, 186 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951).
45. WJHG-TV Loses Equal-Time Appeal, BROADCASTING, Sept. 8, 1969,
at 56.
46. Brigham v. FCC, 276 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1960).
47. Id. The weatherman was not identified by name and this was his regular
occupation.
48. Herbert Steiner, 10 F.C.C.2d 966 (1967).
49. Seven Days To Ask, BROADCASTING, Jan. 12, 1970, at 9.
50. 47 U.S.C. §§ 501-02 (Supp. 1970).
51. Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83 (7th Cir.
1962).
52. Id.
53. 49 U.S.C. § 403, as amended, now 49 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
54. 45 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 1970).
55. 309 F.2d at 85-86.
56. Crommelin v. Capitol Broadcasting Co., 280 Ala. 472, 195 So. 2d 524
(1967).
[Vol. 2
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In 1960 the Kennedy-Nixon television debates were made pos-
sible by the suspension of section 315 as applied to the Presiden-
tial and Vice-Presidential races.57 A similar attempt in 1964
failed.58 The ultimate goal of such suspension was to maximize
exposure of all the major candidates, necessitating the protection
of the broadcasters from equal time requests by "minor" candi-
dates. The very real problem of how to handle minor candidates,
who should not be ignored merely because of relative voter
weakness but who have no claim to fully equal time, persists.
Various solutions have been offered.
59
DVELOPMENT OF THE FA.-NESS DOcrRLE
History
The fairness doctrine, that both sides of controversial issues of
public importance be given fair coverage, originated early in the
history of broadcasting, but only slowly assumed its present
form. Unlike the equal time rules, the doctrine had no explicit
statutory exposition for many years, but derived generally from
the "public interest" concepts of federal regulation.60 The Fed-
eral Communications Commission's predecessor, the Federal
Radio Commission, employed it to reform "propaganda sta-
tions." 61 For an extended period of time, licensees were even
required to refrain from expressing their own views. 62 In the
1940's the doctrine crystallized into its present form through
Commission rulings63 and a series of notices64 and reports.6 5
57. Act of Aug. 24, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-677, 74 Stat. 554.
58. Scott, supra note 35, at 1040.
59. See, e.g., Scott supra, note 35, at 1046-49. An "equitable time" provision
would use a fixed formula to allocate time. Based on the percentage of the
votes received at the last election, candidates could get free time, with minimum
amounts of time for minor candidates and a maximum for the time given to all
candidates together. This "equitable time" concept is not unlike the fairness
doctrine requirements.
60. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929),
rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S.
706 (1930), as cited by Red Lion, 89 S. Ct. at 1800.
61. Id., as cited by Note, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness
Regulations: A First Step Towards Creation of a Right of Access to the Mass
Media, 54 COaNELL L. REV. 294 (1969) (hereinafter cited as A First Step).
62. Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941).
63. Eg., Robert H. Scott, 3 P & F Radio Reg. 259 (1946), as cited in
Barron, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An
Evaluation, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 3 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Barron).
Scott, an atheist, petitioned for nonrenewal of the licensees of three stations
who refused his request to counter various argumentative broadcasts applied to
atheism.
64. Blue Book, FCC Pub. Notice 95462, March 27, 1946, as cited by Barron,
supra note 63, at 4.
65. 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246
(1949).
1970] NOTES
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The 1949 Report on Editorializing removed the ban on advocacy,
but formed the basis for the rules that coverage of public issues
must accurately reflect opposing views,60 that this must be done
at the licensee's own expense if sponsorship were unavailable,67
and that it must be done on the licensee's own initiative if neces-
sary.68 In 1959, section 315 was, as noted above, amended to
exempt news programs from equal time requirements, and then
to place fairness doctrine in statute. 9
The personal attack doctrine was evolved from several 1969
cases 70 and a 1963 Commission report.71 In 1964 the Commission
issued a Fairness Primer,7 2 noncompliance with which resulted
in the issuance in 1967 of the regulations involved in Red Lion.78
The Red Lion decisions below and in the Supreme Court are
apparently the first decisions to uphold the constitutionality of
the doctrine,74 although the question had never been raised pre-
viously.
Operation
It is important to note that under the fairness doctrine, the
licensee retains considerable discretion except in the areas of
personal attacks and editorials in favor of one of several candi-
dates now covered by regulation. There is no requirement that
equal time be devoted to each side.75 Nor is there any fixed rule
66. New Broadcasting Co., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 258 (1950) as cited in
Red Lion, 89 S. Ct. at 1800.
67. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895 (1963), as cited in
Red Lion, 89 S. Ct. at 1800.
68. John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio Reg. 615 (1950), as cited in Red Lion,
89 S. Ct. at 1800.
69. For an extended discussion of the effects of the 1959 amendment, see
Red Lion, 89 S. Ct. at 1801-04 nn.8-14.
70. Eg., Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F Radio Reg. 404 (1962),
cited in Red Lion, 89 S. Ct. at 1797, as the basis of the Commission order to
WBCB.
71. FCC, Stations' Responsibilities Under Fairness Doctrine as to Contro-
versial Issue Programming, 28 Fed. Reg. 7962 (1963), cited by A First Step,
supra note 61, at 294-95 n.2.
72. FCC, Fairness Primer, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415
(1964).
73. Comment, Constitutional Law-Fairness Doctrine-FCC's Formal Rules
Concerning Personal Attacks and Political Editorials Contravene the First
Amendment, 44 NoTRE DAmF LAwYER 447 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Con-
stitutional Law).
74. Fairness Doctrine: Personal Attacks and Public Controversies, 56 GEe.
L. J. 547 (1968).
75. A recent survey, however, indicates that one out of three broadcast
executives incorrectly so believed. Editorializing Tied to Station Revenues,
BROADCASTING, Aug. 7, 1967, at 58-59; cited by Administrative Law-FCC
Fairness Doctrine-Applicability to Advertising, 53 IowA L. REv. 480, 484 n.24
(1967) (hereinafter cited as Administrative Law).
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on how opposing sides of a controversy must be presented: the
licensee should accede to a request to speak by a spokesman for
one side, and should when possible seek out such spokesman, but
it is generally acceptable for the licensee to explain both sides
himself.78 Moreover, although the licensee's overall coverage of
important issues is considered on application for renewal, there
is no compulsion to discuss any given issue and the requirements
of the doctrine arise only after debate has been initiated. Prob-
lems do exist when a complex issue has more than one or two
sides: How completely must the broadcast cover each splinter
group? If several spokesmen come forward, which shall be
chosen?
Truth is not a defense.77 Nor is it a defense that the attack via
one station was in response to an attack via another station, or
via another media. Indeed, in Red Lion, the prior attack was in
a book.
Procedure under the regulations for personal attacks and
political editorials is, of course, more clearly defined.78 After an
attack, the person attacked must be notified within a reasonable
time, not to exceed one week, and transmitted a notification of
the time of the attack, a tape, script or summary of the attack,
and an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond. After a
political editorial, the same must be done within twenty-four
hours, unless the broadcast is within seventy-two hours of the
election, in which case the date, script and offer must be
tendered in advance of the editorial.
Traditionally, enforcement of the fairness doctrine in cases
where the licensee has abused the discretion vested in him has
been weak and uncertain. The principal sanctions have been
the threat of nonrenewal or revocation of a license. 79 These
drastic measures depend, however, on a broadcaster's overall
performance, and have never been invoked solely for failure to
broadcast all sides of an issue, and are unsuitable for single
violations.80 On occasion these sanctions have even been with-
76. FCC, Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246
(1949). In Evening News Assn., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 283 (1950), however,
the Commission rejected a station's proposal to utilize a panel discussion with
management and labor representatives when the union insisted upon purchasing
time for its sole use. See Barron, supra note 63, at 7.
77. One commentator has by analogy to defamation actions suggested that
truth be a defense. See Comment, Fairness Doctrine: Personal Attacks and
Public Controversies, 56 Gao. L. J. 547, 552-53 (1968).
78. 48 Stat. 1801, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. 1970).
79. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (Supp. 1970).
80. Constitutional Law, supra note 73, at 451.
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held for the reason that the particular violation was common or
industry-wide.8' Cease and desist orders and orders to grant
reply time are also available.82 Now, however, after the valida-
tion of the regulations by the Supreme Court, more flexible
statutory sanctions may be imposed on the basis of individual
infractions. Civil forfeitures and criminal fines in amounts not
in excess of a thousand dollars per day and ten thousand dollars
total may be employed by the commission.83
What is the scope of the key phrase "controversial issues of
public importance" l The Commission has not defined the
phrase, rather it has proceeded on an ad hoc basis. Its decisions
indicate that, among others, the following issues qualify: "gov-
ernmental elections, the conduct and administration of public
officials, civil rights and integration, labor legislation and labor
disputes, CATV and subscription television, alleged Communist
infiltration of government, the merits of a nuclear test ban
treaty, a community organization project, the Viet Nam situa-
tion, mail order laboratories, advice on health and diet, United
States aid to eastern European countries, and abuses in the
debt-adjusting business," 4 atheism, alcohol, and tobacco.
Logically, almost any subject might become one of "public im-
portance", and despite frequent requests for specification and
clarification of this phrase,88 an ad hoe basis may well be the
only basis on which to proceed. Similarly imprecise standards
such as "due care" have proved functional, particularly after
long usage. Perhaps the only subjects to which the fairness
doctrine will not apply are those within the specific sphere of
candidate speeches.8 6 In theory and in practice, licensees must
exercise considerable discretion in this area.
81. Eg., Sam Morris, 3 P & F Radio Reg. 154 (1946), cited by Barron,
supra note 63, at 4. (Failure to sell time to temperance spokesman in reply to
liquor advertisements).
82. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (Supp. 1970).
83. 47 U.S.C. §§ 501-02. The "omnipresent threat of suffering severe and
immediate penalties" was considered to be an impermissible burden on broad-
casters' first amendment rights by the Seventh Circuit. 400 F. 2d 1013-14. The
Commission suspended use of the fines until the Supreme Court decision. A
casters' first amendment rights by the Seventh Circuit. 400 F.2d 1013-14. The
Supreme Court validated the regulations without discussion of this point. Re-
cently, however, raising the maximum from $10,000 to $100,000 or $250,000 has
been discussed. Stiffer Penalties, BROADCASTING, Jan. 26 1970, at 5.
84. Administrative Law, supra note 75, at 485 nn.28-40 (citations omitted),
and cases cited therein.
85. Eg., Administrative Law, supra note 75, at 485-86. Some members of
Congress agree. Report Recommends Fairness Reforms, BROADCASTING, May
19, 1969, at 58.
86. Cf. Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 628
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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Determination of what is "controversial" is now also largely
within licensee discretion. Requests for classification here are
better placed.8 7 Public opinion should be the guide. Factors to
consider in gauging public opinion might be the organization
of interest groups, number of speeches on the subject, and addi-
tional comment. The best suggestion, though perhaps the most
costly, is to use polls.s
ADvERTIBSMG
The Commission ruled in 1967 that the fairness doctrine
applied to cigarette advertising and that radio and television
stations which carry cigarette advertising must devote a signifi-
cant amount of broadcast time to presenting the case against
cigarette smoking. 9 Some regarded this as a "major step for-
ward",90 and the National Association of Broadcasters regarded
it as "one of the most revolutionary regulations of the market
place of our time."91 Perceptive students in the field, however,
attributed industry surprise to the uncertainties of the Commis-
sion's ad hoc approach but regarded the ruling as predictable
from prior Commission rulings. 92 Health is certainly an issue
of public concern,93 and advertisement of alcoholic beverages
had twice been examined by the Commission.94 Once renewal
of a license was granted only on condition that advertising of
quack medicines deemed inimical to health cease.95 Many cases
have held that product advertising is at least less vigorously
protected than other forms of speech.90
87. Administrative Law, supra note 75, at 490.
88. Id. This article gives an excellent thorough treatment of this subject.
89. Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), affd., 9 F.C.C.2d
921 (1967). A complaint asked equal time to reply to:
all cigarette advertisements which by their portrayals of youthful
or virile-looking or sophisticated persons enjoying cigarettes in
interesting and exciting situations deliberately seek to create the
impression and present the point of view that smoking is socially
acceptable and desirable, manly, and a necessary part of a rich full
life.
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1968) The smoking-health
issue was considered a controversial issue of public importance.
90. Blalock, Televisions and Advertising, 28 FED. BAR J. 341, 346 (1968).
91. Id., citing 7 T.V. Digest, No. 27, July 3, 1967, at 4.
92. See Administrative Law, supra note 75, at 486.
93. See FCC, Report on "Living Should Be Fun" Inquiry, 33 F.C.C. 101
(1962).
94. FCC, Report on Broadcast of Programs Advertising Alcoholic Bever-
ages, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 593 (1949); Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C. 197 (1946).
95. Fairness and Bankers Life Ins. Co., 2 F.C.C. 455 (1946).
96. g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942). Deceptive adver-
tising is, of course, vigorously regulated by the Federal Trade Commission.
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As noted above, the Commission's ruling was upheld by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in a deci-
sion 7 prior to Red Lion. The Court of Appeals rejected the
three major defense contentions. First, authority for the Com-
mission's action was not preempted by the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965.98 The two concerned
separate fields-labeling on the package and broadcasting, and
Congress had not intended to rely solely on the 1965 Act in this
area. Second, without ruling directlly on the fairness doctrine
issue, the court stated that the ruling was authorized by Con-
gress under the "public interest" standards of the Communica-
tions Act.0 9 Pursuing certain statements in the Commission's
ruling, the court asserted that the public interest indisputably
includes public health, that the Surgeon General and Congress
regarded smoking as a significant threat to health, and that the
measure singling out one product was justified for this "unique
danger authenticated by official and congressional action...."100
The fairness doctrine was not employed as an independent basis
for the decision in deference to the decision in the Seventh Cir-
cuit,10' contrary to the decision of the District of Columbia
Court in Red Lion,10 2 that the doctrine was unconstitutional.
The court noted that both decisions were under consideration by
the Supreme Court. Third, the court dispensed with the asser-
tion that the ruling violated the first amendment, on grounds
similar to those employed in Red Lion. 03  It added that ad-
vertising as such has minimal claims to free speech protection,
but the court only straddled the paradox that either, one, the
advertisements are speech that present a view that required
reply, or, two, was not speech and thus not entitled to free speech
protection. 04
What is the extent of this holding and what will be its effects?
The complaint filed with the Commission asked that anti-smok-
97. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968) A local station, three
networks, the National Association of Broadcasters, the Tobacco Institute and
eight cigarette manufacturers intervened. 405 F.2d at 1087.
98. 79 Stat. 282 (1964), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. 1970) ; 405 F.2d at 1087.
99. 405 F.2d at 1091-99. The Supreme Court has invited the Solicitor General
to file a memorandum with regard to the applicability of Red Lion to this case
on appeal. 89 S. Ct. 2126 (1969).
100. 405 F.2d at 1099.
101. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir.
1968).
102. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
cert. granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967), argument postponed pending the decision
by the Seventh Circuit, 390 U.S. 916 (1968).
103. See text at notes 26-29, supra.
104. See 405 F.2d at 1101-03.
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ing spokesmen be granted equal time. The Commission denied
the request for equal time; only "substantial amounts of time"
must be devoted to anti-smoking spots. The court affirmed.
(The time, of course, must be granted free.) The ultimate effect
of the ruling has, as related above, been the planned withdrawal
of all cigarette advertising from radio and television by the
tobacco industry.105 In the interim, however, many local stations
have refused to carry either cigarette advertisements or replies
thereto.106 The Commission has accepted a ratio of one to five
(that is, for example, one minute of anti-smoking spots for every
five minutes of cigarette advertisements) employed by the net-
works as meeting the "substantial amount" standard.10 7 "Prime
time" has been used.
At one point the Commission indicated that the fairness doc-
trine afforded "an avenue for presenting in regular program
time the viewpoint of responsible spokesmen for the cigarette
advertisers in rebuttal to any health hazard claims made in
opposition to cigarette commercials."108 This statement was
almost immediately retracted. 0 9
The important question is what products besides cigarettes will
require replies to advertisements. Some assert that the Com-
mission will be hard pressed to find a rational basis on which to
limit the holding to its facts. Indeed, the intervenors in
Banzh af contended that nearly all products are subject to some
form of controversy and thought that dissent by a vocal minority
would invoke the doctrine. They contended that even if govern-
ment or private reports would be necessary, many products could
still qualify: "automobiles, food with high cholesteral content,
alcoholic beverages, flouride in toothpaste, pesticide residue in
food, aspirin, detergents, candy, gum, soft drinks, girdles, and
even common table salt."110 The Commission rejected the "pa-
rade of horribles" argument. Nor would an appeal by a vocal
minority suffice. Two factors must coalesce: "one, governmental
and private reports and congressional action with respect to
105. Both the Commission and the Court expressed doubt that advertising
would decline appreciably. 405 F2d at 1102.
106. The Network Formulas for Cigarette Fairness, BROADCASTING, May 5,
1969, at 30.
107. 5-to-1 Smoking Spot Ratio Affirned, BROADCASTING, Dec. 1, 1969, at 38.
108. Television Station WCBS-TV, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine
to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C2d 921, 939-40 (1967).
109. Letter to Thomas J. Dougherty, Sept. 21, 1967, 10 F.C.C. 2d 16 (1967).
110. Television Station WCBS-TV, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine
to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 942 (1967).
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cigarettes, and, two, their assertion in common that normal use
of this product can be a hazard to the health of millions of per-
sons.""' Cigarettes, it said, were "unique", although maybe
other products could in the future reach the same status.
1 1 2
Whether or not the rule will apply to other products remains
to be seen. The Commision indicates now that it will not favor
other complaints. Private citizens, however, may challenge this
judgment in the courts.113 In the area of health concerns, tem-
perance groups may soon request time to counter beer advertise-
ments.114 Beyond this, however, advertising may raise other
controversial issues. For example, the National Mexican-Ameri-
can Anti-Defamation Committee has asked stations to grant
reply time or to drop the "Frito Bandito" commercials, on the
grounds that the ads "picture the Mexican American as a
Spanish-speaking version of Stepin Fetchit or a sneaky untrust-
worthy bandit... [and are] a very effective prejudicial form of
antilocution-effective in terms of making the out-group inferior
and the in-group superior.""1 " Perhaps cigarettes are unique,
but the fairness doctrine has proven its flexibility.'16
All predictions of extensions of the cigarette ruling by the
courts are dependent on the Supreme Court opinion in Banzhaf.
The court has invited the solicitor general to submit memoranda
on the applicability of Red Lion to the case. Should the Court
adopt the Commission's fairness doctrine rationale, then the
potential for extensions of the doctrine is greatest. Should the
court adopt only the circuit court's "public interest" rationale,
far fewer extensions seem possible, for rarely will another
product receive such strong criticism. Should the Court reverse
(in view of the Red Lion holding, the preemption issue seems
the only possible basis for any reversal), then cigarette advertis-
ing will be unburdened. However, even should the Court reverse
on preemption grounds, other advertising might nevertheless be
subject to the fairness doctrine. The Commission's stated un-
111. Id. at 943.
112. Id.
113. The question of whether private citizens have standing to challenge
Commission refusals to act on a complaint is beyond the scope of this paper.
Perhaps resolution of it in a particular case could be made to depend on
whether or not the complainant was within a group adversely affected by the
advertisement, vir., the Frito Bandito complaint below.
114. Temperance and anti-smoking groups seem to be the most active
protestors.
115. Time To Answer Frito Bandito?, BROADCASTING, Dec. 15, 1969, at 37.
116. This is not to suggest that competitors may invoke the doctrine when
one of them advertizes, nor that equal time must be offered. See note 84 supra.
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willingness to go beyond this "unique" product, however, will
likely preclude any such extensions.
APERMATH AND PROSPECrUS
Broadcasters foresee another "parade of horribles" resulting
from the Red Lion decision. Despite exhortation by industry
leaders to "stand firm" for journalistic professionalism, a wither-
ing of media commitment and flavor is predicted. Stations
might avoid issues that will require complete coverage both to
minimize unsponsored expense and to placate advertisers who
do not wish to be associated with unpopular ideas.117 Shows
which feature guests who take strong positions may suffer.
Balanced news programs are dreaded as "bland" an& "neutral",
without recognition that presenting both sides will produce more
spark and interest, not less.118
Contrary to the predictions of the Commission, industry lead-
ers and the Court, there is evidence that some stations are, in
fact, reducing coverage of controversial issues in general" 9 in
addition to rejecting cigarette ads. Not only did the Court pre-
dict otherwise, it mentioned ominously the possibility of license
nonrenewal for such conduct.
By far the worst aspect of the decision from the industry
standpoint, however, is the spectre of Commission control of
programming. A memorandum written for the Commission by
its general counsel states that the Commission:
could indeed prescribe categories of programming and
specify percentages of time to be devoted to them-
all without violating broadcasters' constitutional guar-
antees of free speech or free press, so long as a "rea-
sonable public interest basis" is expressed. 20
117. Advertisers' sensitivity to program content has been extreme. A
natural gas company once blipped every mention of "gas chamber" from a
play about the Neurenburg trials. A power company wanted a new title for
Kipling's The Light That Failed. Chrysler Motors eliminated President Lin-
coln's name from a Civil War story. Chevrolet had ABC-TV refer to S.M.U.'s
"Mustangs" football team as the "Horses, Colts or Ponies'. Blalock, Tele-
vision and Advertising, 28 FED BAR J. 341, 342 (1968).
118. See generally, A Bleak Benchmark it Regulation, BROADCASTING, June
16, 1969, at 21-24.
119. Another Fairness Test Before FCC, BROADCASTING, Feb. 2, 1970, at 59.
A Washington area station refused to sell time to an anti-war group claiming
that station coverage of governmental and military speeches was a broad-
casting of the pro-war side-on the grounds, inter alia, that the station had a
policy of not selling spots dealing with controversial issues.
120. A Legal Go-Ahead for FCC Program Controls?, BROADCASTING, Sept.
15, 1969, at 34.
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The Court's reference to the "public's right of access 'to social,
political, esthetic, moral and other ideas which is crucial...' '21
is portentious. "As 'proxies' or 'fiduciaries' for the community
... broadcasters would appear subject to a wide range of pro-
gram obligations.' ',122
According to the memorandum, which limits itself to state-
ments of the Commission's powers and eschews policy recom-
mendations, the opinion supports the 1960 FCC Report and
Statement of Policy on Programing.123 The 1960 Report sets
out fourteen categories for programming "usually necessary"
for service of the public interest. To broadcasters, the combina-
tion of this language in the opinion and the writing of such a
memorandum gives apparent force to the threat of censorship.
How real is this threat to the "vast wasteland"? Section 320
of the Act expressly prohibits censorship. But is it censorship to
require broadcast of "news programs" in certain amounts, or
"culture programs" in certain amounts-without specification of
what is to be included therein? Or, rather, is censorship only
denial of the right to broadcast a specific program-that is,
subtraction as opposed to addition?
The Court stated:
We need not and do not now ratify every past and
future decision by the FCC with regard to program-
ming. There is no question here of the Commission's
refusal to permit the broadcaster to carry a particular
program or to publish his own views; of a discrimina-
tory refusal to require the licensee to broadcast certain
views which have been denied access to the airways; of
government censorship of a particular program con-
trary to § 326; or of the official government view
dominating public broadcasting. Such questions would
raise more serious First Amendment issues.
124
In this statement, the Court has wisely reserved judgment on the
question of program controls. It rather carefully distinguishes
the case before it from the question considered now. The lan-
guage above regarding access to social, esthetic, etc. ideas many
not apply to this separate question; rather it may refer only to
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 15 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 411, rehearing denied, 17
F.C.C.2d 856, 16 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 185 (1969).
124. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 89 S. Ct 1809-10.
[Vol. 22,
19
Belser: Frontiers of Fairness In Broadcasting
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
issues, controversial issues of public concern. Thus the industry
may take heart.
But beware overconfidence. First, the Court in making its
distinction referred to refusals to carry particular programs. It
speaks of subtractions, not additions, as impermissible. Sec-
cond, the language above regarding access was uttered in the
context of the Commnission's powers under the public interest
standard to license and to regulate generally. In this context,
perhaps the words do have the significance attached to them by
the Commission memorandum.
Perhaps Congressional action is required. The public interest
standard is too broad a statement of public policy for the courts
to apply in this area. Exact guidelines for program control are
unnecessary and unwise for Congress to set. But authority for
the Commission to regulate program context should be expressly
granted, or withdrawn.
CoNCLusIoN
The problem of fairness in broadcasting is of tremendous im-
portance-politically, socially, and economically. Vital interests
are affected. Regrettable indeed is the general confusion as to
the law on the part of the public and the partial confusion even
within the industry. These recent decisions are of landmark
proportions. Perhaps, in addition to their own substantive im-
pact, they may reawaken consciousness of the rights and duties
in the whole area.
CLiNC HEYWAE BELsER, JR.
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